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A Short Treatise on Amateurism 
and Antitrust Law: Why the 
NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
Marc Edelman† 
Abstract 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) oversees 
nearly every aspect of the $11 billion college sports industry. Its 
powers include scheduling championship events, determining 
eligibility rules, entering into commercial contracts, and punishing 
members that refuse to follow its authority. In recent years, some 
NCAA members have become increasingly wealthy—grossing annual 
revenues upwards of $100 million per year. Yet the NCAA’s rules still 
deprive these members of the opportunity to share their wealth with 
student-athletes.  
This Article explains why the NCAA’s “no-pay” rules violate 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part I introduces the NCAA, its 
principle of amateurism, and its traditional enforcement mechanisms. 
Part II provides a brief overview of section 1 of the Sherman Act—the 
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty” in American trade. 
Part III explains why the NCAA’s no-pay rules constitute both an 
illegal form of wage fixing and an illegal group boycott. Part IV then 
explores eight lower court decisions that incorrectly held the NCAA’s 
eligibility rules were noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny. Meanwhile, Part V analyzes four additional lower court 
decisions that misconstrued the NCAA’s eligibility rules as 
procompetitive under a rule of reason analysis. Finally, Part VI 
concludes that even if a court were to find that competitive balance is 
a reasonable basis for upholding certain no-pay rules, such rules still 
should not be promulgated by the NCAA, but rather by individual 
conferences. 
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Introduction 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) oversees 
nearly every aspect of the $11 billion college sports industry.1 Its 
powers include scheduling championship events, determining 
eligibility rules, entering into commercial contracts, and punishing 
members that refuse to follow its authority.2 In recent years, some 
NCAA members have become increasingly wealthy—grossing annual 
revenues upwards of $100 million per year.3 Yet the NCAA’s rules 
deprive these members of the opportunity to share their wealth with 
student-athletes.4 Instead, the NCAA and its leaders hide behind a 
“veil of amateurism” that maintains the wealth of college sports “in 
the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors, and 
coaches.”5  
 
1. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 
(1984) (explaining that, since the NCAA’s inception in 1905, the NCAA 
has “adopted and promulgated playing rules, standards of amateurism, 
standards for academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruitment of 
athletes, and rules governing the size of athletic squads and coaching 
staffs”); see also Where Does the Money Go?, Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCA
A/Answers/Nine+points+to+consider_one (accessed by entering the 
URL in the Internet Archive index) (stating that “[o]verall annual 
revenue for college athletics programs for 2008–09 was estimated at 
about $10.6 billion”). 
2. See infra Part I.A–B. 
3. See College Athletics Revenues and Expenses, ESPN.COM, 
http://espn.go.com/ncaa/revenue (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (showing 
that, in 2008, five NCAA member schools grossed revenue in excess of 
$100 million per year and several others were close to that threshold). 
4. See 2013–14 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.1.2, at 59 (2013) 
[hereinafter 2013–14 Division I Manual], available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4322-2013-2014-ncaa-division-i-
manual.aspx (prohibiting, as part of the criteria for amateur status, 
individuals from receiving various forms of “pay” in return for “athletics 
skill or participation”); see also David Wharton, Plan Is on the Money 
to Some: Conferences Will Have Option of Giving Student-Athletes an 
Extra $2,000 a Year, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at C1 (quoting Boise 
State University President Robert Kustra’s position that, even though 
student-athletes are unpaid, they “have it pretty good”); 
NCAA Office of the President, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/NCAA+Presiden
t/NCAA+President+Mark+Emmert (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting 
NCAA president Mark Emmert’s declaration that “[a]s long as [he is] 
president of the NCAA, [it] will not pay student-athletes to play sports”). 
5. Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New 
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
495 (2008) (arguing that college sports hide behind a “veil of amateurism” 
because “[t]he idea that major college sports are amateur is demonstrably 
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Although the NCAA rulebook has long evaded legal scrutiny, 
courts are finally beginning to overturn certain aspects of the NCAA’s 
rules that are deemed to be anticompetitive. For example, courts have 
struck down the NCAA’s nationwide limits on televised football 
broadcasts and its caps on assistant coaches’ salaries.6 Nevertheless, 
the need to reform the college athletics industry extends far beyond 
these areas. It is not just the outer fringes of the NCAA rules that 
violate antitrust law: it is the whole shebang. 
This Article explains why the NCAA’s no-pay rules violate 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part I introduces the NCAA, its 
principle of amateurism, and its traditional enforcement mechanisms. 
Part II provides a brief overview of section 1 of the Sherman Act—the 
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty” in American trade.7 
Part III, applying precedent from the Supreme Court and the Tenth 
Circuit, explains why the NCAA no-pay rules constitute both an 
illegal form of wage fixing and an illegal group boycott. Part IV then 
explores eight lower court decisions that incorrectly held the NCAA 
eligibility rules were noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny. Meanwhile, Part V analyzes four additional lower court 
decisions that misconstrued the NCAA eligibility rules as 
procompetitive under a rule of reason review. Finally, Part VI 
concludes that even if a court were to find that competitive balance is 
a reasonable basis for upholding certain no-pay rules, such rules still 
should not be promulgated by the NCAA, but rather by the 
individual conferences. 
I. The NCAA, Its Principle of Amateurism, and Its 
Internal Enforcement Mechanisms 
A. The NCAA 
The NCAA is the “dominant trade association” of American 
colleges that compete in intercollegiate sports.8 It comprises 
 
false”); Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s 
College Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. Reform 861, 864 (2002). 
6. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88 (overturning the NCAA’s limits on 
televised football broadcasts); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 
1998) (holding that a salary cap on “restricted-earnings” coaches is 
illegal). 
7. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also Reitner 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (describing how the 
Sherman Act economically protects people as individuals). 
8. Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Ind. 1990), aff’d, 977 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. 
NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) 
(describing the NCAA as “the largest and most prestigious association 
of colleges and athletic conferences in the United States”). 
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approximately twelve hundred member schools that participate in 
ninety-five different active athletic conferences.9 Its mission is to 
promulgate playing rules, host championship events, enforce 
standards of academic eligibility, and promote the general growth of 
college athletics.10 
The NCAA was first chartered in 1905 by trustees of sixty-two 
colleges as a forum to discuss health risks in college sports.11 But by 
the end of World War II, the NCAA had expanded its reach into 
hosting sporting events and setting eligibility rules.12 In 1948, the 
NCAA introduced its first written code to govern members’ recruiting 
practices and financial aid payouts.13 Then, four years later, the 
NCAA replaced that code with a broader set of rules to govern 
membership, infractions, and punishment.14 
 
9. See Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 
957 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the NCAA’s membership includes more 
than twelve hundre colleges); About the NCAA: Membership, Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/membership+new (last updated Aug. 13, 
2012) (stating that there are a total of 95 active NCAA conferences in 
Division I, Division II, and Division III sports); see also Bd. of Regents, 
468 U.S. at 99 (1984) (defining the NCAA as “an association of schools 
which compete against each other to attract television revenues, not to 
mention fans and athletes”). 
10. See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 957 (explaining that the NCAA 
“promulgates rules and regulations” pertaining to college sports); see 
also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153 
(10th Cir. 1983) (describing the NCAA as “essentially an integration of 
the rulemaking and rule-enforcing activities of its member institutions”), 
aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 852 (explaining that 
according to the NCAA’s constitution, its purpose is to maintain 
amateur athletics “as an integral part of the educational program and 
the athlete as an integral part of the student body and by so doing, 
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and 
professional sports”).  
11. History, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/History (last 
updated Aug. 13, 2012). 
12. See Enforcement, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130310042307/http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm
/connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/resources/chronology+of+enforcement 
(last updated Jan. 21, 2013) (accessed using the Internet Archive index) 
(noting the NCAA’s 1948 adoption of strict regulations and the 
establishment of an investigative committee).  
13. See id. (describing the “Sanity Code” as “the first set of regulations 
with teeth”). 
14. See id. (explaining the creation and scope of authority of the 
Membership Committee and its Subcommittee on Infractions). 
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Today, the NCAA operates pursuant to a formal constitution and 
bylaws that are voted upon by its members.15 In addition, NCAA 
members vote annually on committee members to “direct policy 
between [annual] conventions.”16 As a condition of membership, all 
NCAA colleges must agree to abide by the association’s written rules, 
as well as by its committees’ decisions.17 Members do not have the 
chance to opt out of rules based on their financial preference, nor do 
they have the right to opt out on moral grounds.18 
B. The NCAA’s Principle of Amateurism and Its Enforcement 
One area in which the NCAA establishes rules pertains to the 
amateur status of student-athletes. The NCAA’s principle of 
amateurism, as drafted and approved by its membership, states that 
“student-athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate sport, and their 
participation shall be motivated by education and by the physical, 
mental and social benefits to be derived.”19 As such, the NCAA 
bylaws limit the quantity of student-athletes’ financial aid to an 
amount “set by the Association’s membership.”20 In addition, NCAA 
bylaws prohibit student-athletes from accepting remuneration in any 
form based on their status as athletes.21 
 
15. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 
(W.D. Okla. 1982), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th 
Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Worldwide Basketball, 388 
F.3d at 957 (noting that the NCAA “adopts bylaws formulated by a 
legislative body drawn from the Association’s membership”). 
16. Warner Amex Cable Commc’ns v. Am. Broad. Cos., 499 F. Supp. 537, 
540 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1980); see also Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 183 
(1998) (explaining that NCAA “member institutions agree to abide by 
and enforce [association] rules”). 
17. See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 957. 
18.  E.g., 2013–14 Division I Manual, supra note 4, §§ 2.8, 3.1.1, 3.2.1.2, 
3.2.4.1, at 4, 8–9 (setting forth the principle of rules compliance and 
unequivocally requiring all members to adhere to the rules and 
principles set forth in the NCAA constitution, bylaws, and legislation). 
19. Id. § 2.9, at 4 (setting forth the principle of amateurism); see also Marc 
Edelman, Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole: Protecting College 
Athletes’ Publicity Rights in Commercial Videogames, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
553, 557 (2013) (quoting the principle of amateurism); cf. Kenneth L. 
Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and 
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 9 (1991) (“The payment 
of money to amateur athletes has traditionally been viewed to be 
contrary to the very essence of the true meaning of amateurism.”). 
20. 2013–14 Division I Manual, supra note 4, § 12.01.4, at 57. 
21. Edelman, supra note 19, at 577 (citing 2011–12 Division I Manual, 
§ 12.1.2, at 62 (2011), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D112.pdf). NCAA no-pay rules were originally 
intended to preserve the scarce number of college athletic opportunities 
for members of the general student body. See Jennifer A. Mueller, The 
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In modern times, the NCAA works tirelessly to enforce its 
principle of amateurism.22 One way that the NCAA enforces this 
principle is by levying penalties against members that provide 
student-athletes with benefits beyond the NCAA-permitted amount. 
Such penalties may include fines, the loss of television appearances, or 
revocation of the opportunity to compete in postseason games.23 In 
addition, the NCAA’s most severe penalty—colloquially known as the 
“death penalty”—empowers the association to shut down any repeat 
violator’s athletic program during regular-season competition.24 
Since the NCAA first established its death penalty in June 1985, 
the association has only enforced the sanction once, against Southern 
Methodist University’s football team during the 1987 athletic season.25 
This sanction resulted in Southern Methodist University’s dramatic 
 
Best Defense Is a Good Offense: Student-Athlete Amateurism Should 
Not Become a Fantasy, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 527, 534–35 
(2009) (explaining how the NCAA’s principle of amateurism was 
originally intended to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral 
part of the student body”). 
22. See Steve Ellis, University Officials Approve Get-Tough Measures, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 22, 1985, at C1 (explaining why the NCAA 
passed measures that called for “tougher penalties for cheaters and 
greater institutional responsibility”). 
23. 2013–14 Division I Manual, supra note 4, §§ 19.9.5.1–.2, 10.9.7(h), at 
322–23. 
24. Id. §§ 19.9.3, 19.9.7(a), at 321–23 (authorizing the disciplinary panel 
ban “specified competition in the sport during the regular season” and 
enumerating aggravating factors, such as repeat violations, that would 
justify such a penalty); see also Ellis, supra note 22 (describing the 
death penalty as a “two-year ban on scholarships, recruiting, and 
intercollegiate competition”); S.M.U. Awaits Decision, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 21, 1987, at 51 (describing the NCAA’s adoption of the death 
penalty); NCAA Committee on Infractions, Southern Methodist 
University Infractions Report 2 (Feb. 25, 1987) [hereinafter SMU 
INFRACTIONS REPORT] (“At the June 1985 special Convention, the 
NCAA membership enacted a series of mandatory penalties applicable 
to member institutions found guilty of repeat major violations.”). 
25. See SMU Infractions Report, supra note 24, at 2 (“During the 
period September 1985 through December 1986, monthly payments 
ranging from $50 to $725 were made to numerous student-athletes in 
the sport of football from funds provided by an outside representative of 
the university’s athletics interests.”). The report also found that 
“[thirteen] football team members received payments during the 1985–86 
academic year that totaled approximately $47,000, and eight student-
athletes continued to receive payments from September through 
December 1986 that totaled approximately $14,000.” Id. See also Time 
to Bench S.M.U.?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1986, at 26 (noting that SMU 
was accused specifically of paying one student-athlete $25,000 to sign a 
national letter of intent and arranging with another alumnus to provide 
free housing for a student-athlete). 
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loss of football-related revenues, not only for that particular season 
but also for many years that followed.26 The economic annihilation of 
Southern Methodist University’s football program continues to serve 
as a powerful deterrent against other colleges paying their student-
athletes.27  
C. How Fear of the “Death Penalty” Has Chilled Student-Athlete Pay 
and Destroyed the Free Market for College Athletics  
to the Detriment of Consumers 
In recent years, most NCAA members have fully abided by the 
NCAA’s principle of amateurism, even though it has meant that 
college athletic directors and coaches earn millions of dollars while 
their student-athletes continue to live below the poverty line.28 Even 
in the cases in which a particular athletic director or coach has 
wanted to improve his athletes’ standard of living, the NCAA 
 
26. See Michael Goodwin, N.C.A.A. Bans Football at S.M.U. for ’87 
Season, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1987, at A1 (noting that shortly after the 
NCAA sought to impose its death penalty, it seemed the sanction was 
intended primarily to ensure that a school would be denied “important 
sources of revenue”). 
27. See Ellis, supra note 22 (quoting Clemson University’s Bill Atchley, who 
described the sanction as a “deterrent”); see also SMU INFRACTIONS 
REPORT, supra note 24, at 2–6 (noting that the sanction in which an 
NCAA member loses its ability to compete in a given sport is referred to 
as the death penalty and is intended to have a “deterrent value for 
others who might be tempted” to violate the NCAA rules, which held 
true in the SMU case because, once the threat of such sanction became 
recognized, there was “evidence of actions by the university to obtain 
full compliance with NCAA regulations”); N.C.A.A. Acts Against 
Kansas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1988, at B9 (explaining that the NCAA’s 
threat to give the University of Kansas basketball team such a sanction 
led the university to cut ties with three boosters who were purportedly 
paying the school’s athletes). See generally Joe Drape, Penalties Upheld 
for Alabama and Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at D6 (quoting 
the chairman of the NCAA Appeals Committee, Terry Don Phillips, as 
saying that “[t]he death penalty would have likely been imposed” 
against the University of Alabama’s football team if it were not for 
“institutional cooperation” to stop the payments from boosters to 
college athletes).  
28. See Joe Nocera, Here’s How to Pay Up Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, 
32 (Magazine) (noting that premier college coaches can earn “as much 
or more than a professional coach” and that, specifically, Ohio State 
University football coach Urban Meyer makes an estimated $4 million 
per year); see also Fred Frommer, Advocacy Group Says Top College 
Athletes Worth Six Figures, ESPN.COM, Sept. 12, 2011, 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6962151/advocacy-group-
says-top-college-athletes-worth-six-figures (discussing a survey that 
found even student-athletes that received the maximum amount of 
financial aid permitted under the NCAA’s bylaws are often left “below 
the poverty line”). 
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amateurism bylaws serve as an impediment.29 For example, in June 2011, 
seven Southeastern Conference football coaches proposed designating a 
share of their multimillion-dollar salaries to establish stipends of $300 
per game for their student-athletes.30 However, superiors at each 
school nixed the stipend plan in fear of the NCAA’s rebuke.31 
The NCAA’s continued failure to allow colleges to make 
independent business decisions about student-athlete pay hurts not 
only the student-athletes but also the college football consumers.32 For 
example, if the seven Southeastern Conference colleges had not 
quashed their coaches’ stipend plan, those colleges would have been 
able to use the stipends to recruit better players—producing a 
stronger on-field football product and thus leading to greater fan 
satisfaction.33 Nevertheless, by complying with a zero salary cap, these 
colleges succumbed to the will of the majority and surrendered the 
opportunity to compete most effectively both on and off the field.34 
 
29. For further information on the NCAA amateurism bylaws and the 
enforcement of these bylaws, see supra Part I.B. 
30. See Spurrier Proposes Paying Players, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
June 5, 2011, at D9 (describing how Spurrier, head coach of the South 
Carolina Gamecocks, proposed a plan to pay football players $300 per 
game out of his own salary). 
31. See generally NCAA Shelves $2,000 Athlete Stipend, ESPN.COM, (Dec. 
16, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7357868/ncaa-
puts-2000-stipend-athletes-hold (expressing concern that paying stipends 
to student-athletes would “violate the NCAA’s philosophy on amateur 
sports”). 
32. Cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 
(1984) (holding that “[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the 
importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not 
consistent with . . . antitrust law”). 
33. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be 
Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 211 (1990) (noting that if 
an individual NCAA member provides greater compensation to student-
athletes than the NCAA-permitted amount, “it may 
attract better athletes, larger attendance, more lucrative television 
contracts, and greater national publicity”). But cf. Gary R. Roberts, The 
NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2651 
(1996) (“The extent to which a system of free-market bidding for 
players [in college athletics] would thus reshuffle the allocation of 
players among colleges is hard to determine, and it would be even 
harder to ascertain the extent to which the reshuffled deck would 
provide a better quality product for consumers.”). 
34. Cf. Goldman, supra note 33, at 226–27 (recognizing that a cap on 
college athlete compensation prevents schools from competing for 
student-athletes in a free market based on their internal resources). 
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II. An Introduction to Section 1 of  
the Sherman Act 
The NCAA’s principle of amateurism is long embedded in the 
history of college athletics; however, its concerted effort to destroy the 
free market for recruiting student-athletes is subject to scrutiny under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.35 Indeed, the principle’s no-pay rules 
can reasonably be interpreted as the very antithesis to the type of 
competitive markets envisioned by drafters of the Sherman Act.36 
A. Overview 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that 
“[e]very contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy, in the restraint of 
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”37 This section of 
antitrust law provides “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty 
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of 
trade.”38 It rests on the basic belief that “unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest 
material progress.”39 
Read literally, section 1 of the Sherman Act would seem to 
prohibit all commercial contracts.40 However, courts have interpreted 
the act, in conjunction with preexisting common law, to prohibit only 
 
35. See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, Atlantic Monthly, 
Oct. 2011, at 84 (explaining that the NCAA has attempted to enshrine 
amateur ideals into collegiate sports since its inception); see also Bd. of 
Regents, 468 U.S. at 99 (1984) (“By participating in an association 
which prevents member institutions from competing against each 
other . . . the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal 
restraint—an agreement among competitors on the way in which they 
will compete with one another. A restraint of this type has often been 
held to be unreasonable as a matter of law.”). 
36. See discussion infra Part III.  
37. Sherman Act §§ 1–7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
38. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342–43 (1979). 
39. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 4; see also Baum Research & Dev. Co. v. 
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(“The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately 
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods 
and services.” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 695 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
40. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1304 
(W.D. Okla. 1982) aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th 
Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Law v. NCAA, 902 
F. Supp. 1394, 1402 (D. Kan. 1995). 
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those contracts that “unreasonably” restrain trade.41 To determine 
whether a restraint “unreasonably” restrains trade, a court will apply 
a two-part test.42 First, the court will determine whether the restraint 
involves “concerted action between two legally distinct economic 
entities” in a manner that affects “trade or commerce among the 
several states” (“threshold requirements”).43 If these threshold 
requirements are met, the court will then determine whether the 
alleged restraint unduly suppresses competition within any relevant 
market (“competitive effects test”).44 
 
41. Bd. of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911)); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 
1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Because nearly every contract that binds 
the parties to an agreed course of conduct is a ‘restraint of trade’ of 
some sort, the Supreme Court has limited the restrictions contained in 
section 1 to bar only ‘unreasonable restraints of trade.’” (quoting NCAA 
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984))); Coll. 
Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at 
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) (reaching the same conclusion regarding 
“unreasonable” restraints of trade). 
42. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1016 (describing this two-step test); cf. Marc 
Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from 
Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct 
Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 640 (2009) 
(describing a similar three-part test involving threshold issues, an 
analysis of competitive effects, and finally the analysis of preemption 
and other non-competition-based affirmative defenses). 
43. Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. 
Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Sherman Act §1, 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (requiring that, to be illegal, the contract, 
combination, or conspiracy must be “in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States”); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 
F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (“Before a concerted refusal to 
deal can be illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, two threshold 
elements must be present: (1) there must be some effect on ‘trade or 
commerce among the several States’, and (2) there must be sufficient 
agreement to constitute a ‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.’”). 
44. See Edelman, supra note 42, at 646 (explaining that the court will find 
a net anticompetitive effect “where the anticompetitive effects of a 
particular agreement are greater than their pro-competitive benefits”); 
see also Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D. Ind. 1990) 
(“Whether a particular arrangement violates the Sherman Act depends 
upon the arrangement’s effect upon competition in the relevant 
marketplace.”).  
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B. Threshold Requirements 
In assessing the threshold requirements of an antitrust challenge, 
a court will often consider each requirement separately.45 To 
determine whether a restraint involves the first threshold 
requirement—“concerted action between two legally distinct economic 
entities”46—a court will consider whether there is evidence of an 
agreement, either written or implied, between entities that lack a 
common objective.47 This requirement compels plaintiffs to show the 
presence of an agreement that “deprives the marketplace of 
independent centers of decisionmaking . . . and thus of actual and 
potential competition.”48 
Similarly, to ascertain whether a restraint affects the other 
threshold requirement—“trade or commerce among the several 
States”49—a court will determine whether the restraint involves “the 
exchange or buying and selling of commodities especially on a large 
scale involving transportation from place to place.”50 Under a modern 
 
45. See generally Edelman, supra note 42, at 642 (explaining that a 
reviewing court begins “its analysis by determining whether [the] two 
threshold issues are met”). 
46.  Primetime, 219 F.3d at 103 (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d 
at 542). 
47. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010) (“The 
relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a ‘contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy’ amongst ‘separate economic actors 
pursuing separate economic interests’ . . . .” (quoting Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984))); see 
also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
“[t]here is no question that all NCAA member schools have agreed to 
abide by the Bylaws,” so “the first showing of an agreement or 
contract is therefore not at issue in this case”); Hairston v. Pac. 10 
Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that an 
agreement among all of the colleges in the Pac-10 conference “fulfills 
the ‘contract, combination, and conspiracy’ prong” (quoting NCAA v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984))). 
48. American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212. 
49.  Sherman Act §1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
50. Webster’s Third Int’l Dictionary 456 (3d ed. 1986); see also 
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 338 (finding a commercial transaction to occur 
between a student-athlete and his college where “the student-athlete 
uses his athletic abilities on behalf of the university in exchange for an 
athletic or academic education, room, and board”); Bassett v. NCAA, 
528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a rule inhibiting NCAA 
member schools from hiring coaches that had been previously sanctioned 
by the NCAA to be “anti-commercial”); Worldwide Basketball & Sport 
Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) (implying that 
certain trade-association rules may be deemed noncommercial if they are 
not based on business motives); Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (agreeing 
with the parties that the “agreement affects interstate commerce”). 
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view, the actual amount of interstate activity, as compared to 
intrastate activity, is irrelevant so long as “it is not insubstantial.”51 
Thus, “almost every activity from which [an] actor anticipates 
economic gain” will be found to affect interstate commerce.52 
C. Competitive Effects Analysis 
Presuming that both threshold requirements are met, a court will 
next review the restraint’s competitive effects by applying one of 
three sanctioned tests: (1) per se, (2) rule of reason, or (3) quick-look. 
On one end of the spectrum, if a restraint is “so nefarious” that there 
is high probability that it lacks any redeeming value, a court will 
apply the per se test.53 The per se test presumes that a restraint 
suppresses competition without engaging in any further inquiry.54 
Thus, a court will declare the restraint to be illegal unless a special 
antitrust exemption applies.55 
On the other end of the spectrum, if a court, upon first 
impression, believes that a restraint is likely to have some competitive 
benefit, it will instead apply the rule of reason test.56 The rule of 
 
51. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing United 
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1947)). 
52. IA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
¶ 260b, at 250 (2d ed. 2000). 
53. Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark 
Licensing Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of 
American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
183, 197 (2011); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) 
(“Some types of restraints . . . have such predictable and pernicious 
anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive 
benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se.”); Geneva Pharms. Tech. 
Corp. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 506 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that conduct is per se illegal if it falls within “the narrow range of 
behavior that is considered so plainly anti-competitive and so lacking in 
redeeming pro-competitive value that it is ‘presumed illegal without any 
further examination’” (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8 
(1979))). 
54. See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“It is only when the plaintiff adequately states a per se violation 
of § 1 of the Sherman Act that an allegation of anticompetitive effects is 
not required.”). 
55. Cf. Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and “Free Movement” 
Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 403, 415 (2009) (“In the context of professional 
sports . . . the two most applicable defenses or exemptions to Section 1 
of the Sherman Act are the statutory labor exemption and the non-
statutory labor exemption.”). 
56. See Edelman, supra note 53, at 198 (noting that the rule of reason test 
is applied when courts believe an arrangement is likely to have 
redeeming benefits). 
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reason test “distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive 
effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating 
competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.”57 It requires 
investigating every aspect of a restraint, including whether the parties 
to the restraint had the power to control any relevant market 
(“market power”), whether the restraint encourages or suppresses 
competition, and whether the restraint caused the marketplace 
“antitrust harm.”58  
Finally, in the third set of circumstances, a court may elect to 
perform an “abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason analysis.”59 
Under this third test, a court will probe into certain aspects of a 
restraint while relying on its initial presumptions about others.60 Most 
courts that apply the quick-look test do so in favor of the plaintiff 
based on a preliminary finding of anticompetitive effects, relieving the 
burden of establishing market power and shifting the burden to the 
defendant to provide justification.61 Nevertheless, two recent antitrust 
 
57. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 
(2007). 
58. See Edelman, supra note 53, at 198–99; see also Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (describing the rule 
of reason as “an inquiry into market power and market structure”); 
Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 
(6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[u]nder the rule of reason analysis, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the conduct complained of 
produces significant anticompetitive effects within the relevant product 
and geographic markets” (quoting NHL Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth 
Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003))); cf. Banks v. 
NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087–88 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that, with 
respect to the requirement of showing antitrust harm, “[t]he purpose of 
the Sherman Act is to rectify the injury to consumers caused by 
diminished competition” and “not only an injury to [one]self” (quoting 
Car Carriers, 745 F.2d at 1107–08)). 
59. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 757 (1999) (defining the 
abbreviated or “quick look” rule of reason test as one that should be 
used “when an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets”); see also Edelman, 
supra note 53, at 197 (“In the middle of the spectrum, where an 
arrangement seems less nefarious, a court may instead apply the ‘quick 
look’ test . . . .”). 
60. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 
294 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the district court’s finding that a quick-
look analysis—which could have relieved the evidentiary burden for 
establishing the issues of market power and actual adverse effect on 
competition—did not apply). 
61. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–13 
(1984) (holding that while market power was evident as a matter of fact 
without extensive analysis, as a matter of law, no such market analysis 
was required because the anticompetitive effects were clearly 
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decisions have found that courts may also adopt the quick-look test in 
favor of defendants if the alleged restraint is “essential if the product 
is to be available at all.”62 
III. Analyzing the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
There are two formidable ways by which a plaintiff could 
challenge the NCAA’s no-pay rules under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The first is to contend that the no-pay rules represent a form of 
wage fixing that harms not only the market for student-athlete 
services but also the quality of college sports’ on-field product. The 
second is to argue that the NCAA rules constitute an illegal group 
boycott of those colleges that would otherwise compete in a free 
market to recruit student-athletes. 
Under both legal theories, courts would likely review the NCAA’s 
no-pay rules under the full rule of reason test because NCAA 
members “share an interest in making the entire league successful and 
profitable” and thus collectively benefit from cooperating on “the 
production and scheduling of games.”63 Under the wage-fixing theory, 
student-athletes would be the ideal plaintiffs to challenge the NCAA’s 
restraints; meanwhile, under the group-boycott theory, the ideal 
plaintiff would be an NCAA member. 
 
demonstrated and thus required “some competitive justification” from 
the defendant); see also Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394, 1405 (D. 
Kan. 1995) (“[B]ecause adverse effects on competition are apparent, the 
court does not require proof of market power, and instead moves 
directly to an analysis of the defendant’s proffered competitive 
justifications for the restraint.”), aff’d, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).  
62. Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting 
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 
F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that certain joint venture 
conduct that is necessary for the joint venture to exist in the first place 
is “presumptively procompetitive”). 
63. American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010); see also Texaco, Inc. v. 
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 1, 5 (2006) (“It is not per se illegal under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set 
the prices at which it sells its products.”); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. 
Supp. 356, 380 (D. Ariz. 1983) (noting that “[a] clear trend has emerged 
in recent years under which courts have been extremely reluctant to 
subject the rules and regulations of sports organizations to the group 
boycott per se analysis”). But see Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 108 (1984) 
(applying the quick-look test to review of the NCAA’s television 
broadcast practices). 
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A. Challenging the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules As Illegal              
Wage-Fixing Restraints 
The argument that the NCAA’s no-pay rules constitute illegal 
wage fixing is best supported by precedent from the Supreme Court 
and the Tenth Circuit. As cases in these courts explain, wage fixing 
involves any agreement by two or more employers to set the 
compensation rate of workers at a pre-specified amount.64 Generally, 
courts find wage fixing to be illegal not only because it harms workers 
but also because it injures the competitive marketplace by driving 
workers away from their current line of employment and into another 
field where their work product is less valuable to society.65 
Furthermore, courts generally recognize that an agreement to fix 
employee wages outside the scope of a collective bargaining agreement 
illegally “restrain[s] mobility on the part of employees who would 
otherwise have the opportunity, in a competitive market for services, 
to transfer to higher paid opportunities [that otherwise would be] 
offered by others.”66 
Applying these well-established principles, the Tenth Circuit held 
in Law v. NCAA67 that the NCAA’s attempt to cap assistant coaches’ 
salaries was illegal because it depressed coaches’ compensation 
without promoting any legitimate antitrust goal.68 The court 
concluded that it was irrelevant whether the NCAA salary restraint 
opened up coaching opportunities for newer coaches because this 
rationale related entirely to social preferences that are divorced from 
 
64. John H. Johnson, Jess David & Paul A. Torelli, Empirical Evidence and 
Class Certification in Labor Market Antitrust Cases, 25 ANTITRUST 60, 
63 (2010). 
65. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (explaining that “[a]thletic prowess is, of course, a unique and 
highly specialized resource, of precisely the genre vulnerable to 
monopsony manipulation” and if sports “team owners join together to 
suppress the price of athletic services through monopsony practices, 
most athletes will not be able to switch profitably to other lines of 
work,” thus creating a “labor market for professional athletes’ 
services . . . where there is real potential for anticompetitive 
monopsonistic practices”); cf. Michael G. Langan, Comment, Why a 
Fixed Salary for Developmental Squad Players Does Not Hurt the Game: 
Defending the Decision Not to Argue Consumer Injury in Brown v. Pro 
Football, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 559, 560 (1997) (discussing an 
argument by Penn State Law School sports and antitrust law professor 
Stephen F. Ross that explains why a wage-fixing restraint in the context 
of a sports injury can lead to widespread consumer harm). 
66. See Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606–07 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
67.  134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
68. Id. at 1020. 
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the notion of an open, competitive marketplace.69 Likewise, the court 
rejected the argument that a salary cap was beneficial to the free 
market because it would cut all NCAA members’ costs: “cost-cutting 
by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification” and “[i]f it were, 
any group of competing buyers [would then be allowed to] agree on 
maximum prices.”70 
There is, of course, one important distinction between the court’s 
holding in Law and a theoretical antitrust challenge posited against 
the NCAA’s student-athlete no-pay rules: unlike assistant coaches, 
student-athletes have not traditionally been defined as employees, so 
the collective determination of their pay has not traditionally been 
construed as wage fixing.71 Nevertheless, any empirical observation of 
student-athletes’ daily activities shows that student-athletes are 
closely akin in practice to traditional workers.72 For example, “a self-
study performed by the NCAA in 2011” found that “Division I 
[college] football players [devoted] an average of 43.3 hours per week 
to their sport”—more time than they spent on academic activities, 
and more than a typical U.S. worker spends on his profession.73 In 
addition, student-athletes seem to meet the Internal Revenue 
Service’s multifactor test for employment because NCAA coaching 
staffs exercise year-round behavioral controls over student-athletes 
and impose strict limits on their outside financial activities.74 
Furthermore, in the context of workers’ compensation law, at least 
 
69. Id. at 1021–22 (“While opening up coaching positions for younger people 
may have social value apart from its affect [sic] on competition, we may 
not consider such values unless they impact upon competition.”). 
70. Id. at 1022 (explaining further that setting maximum prices generally 
“reduces the incentive among suppliers to improve their products” in 
the context of college basketball coaches, and it would similarly create 
“less incentive to improve their performance if their salaries are 
capped”). Also, the court rejected the argument that the cap on certain 
coaches’ salaries was needed to maintain competitive balance among 
teams because, “[w]hile the REC [Restricted Earnings Coach] Rule 
[would] equalize the salaries paid to entry-level Division I coaches, it is 
not clear the REC Rule [would] equalize the experience level of such 
coaches” nor level the cost structure overall of operating college sport. 
Id. at 1024. 
71. See generally Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The 
Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete As Employee, 
81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 129 (2006) (highlighting the argument made by 
some that student-athletes cannot be victims of wage fixing because 
they are not employees). 
72. Id. 
73. Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible Labor Market: 
College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
1077, 1099 (2012).  
74. Id. at 1094–95. 
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one court has issued an award to a student-athlete—thus treating him 
as a de facto employee.75 
All of these factors combine to significantly rebut the 
longstanding legal fiction advanced by the NCAA that student-
athletes are foremost students and not workers. Indeed, there is even 
some evidence that this legal fiction was created by the NCAA for the 
specific purpose of trying to avoid antitrust scrutiny.76 Thus, it would 
be the most bizarre of loopholes to allow the NCAA to evade 
antitrust scrutiny simply by applying a dubious label to their business 
practices.77 
B. Challenging the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules As an Illegal Group Boycott 
There is also a strong argument that the NCAA’s no-pay rules 
constitute an illegal group boycott against colleges that would 
otherwise seek to pay their student-athletes.78 In contrast to the wage-
fixing argument, the group-boycott argument is strongest if brought 
by an NCAA member, given the well-established precedent that 
members of private associations have antitrust standing to sue their 
associations.79 
 
75. See id. at 1103 (citing Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 
1953)) (holding that a student-athlete’s award of worker’s compensation 
benefits was proper because the injuries to his back sustained during 
football practice arose out of and in the course of employment). 
76. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 71, at 74 (arguing that the 
NCAA self-coined the term “student-athlete” to perpetuate a myth of 
amateurism and “obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related 
benefits of the athletes’ talents, time, and energy”). 
77. See generally Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010) 
(“An ongoing § 1 violation cannot evade § 1 scrutiny simply by giving 
the ongoing violation a name and label.”). 
78. Cf. Edelman, supra note 5, at 871 (“[R]ules limiting student-athlete wages 
operate as a restraint of trade on a relevant commercial market.”). 
79. The added challenge for a student-athlete bringing a group boycott 
claim against the NCAA is based on the issue of standing—the 
requirement that a plaintiff suffer a loss or prospective loss that is 
related to one’s business or property. In Justice v. NCAA, the District 
of Arizona found that a group of college football players could not state 
an antitrust claim against the NCAA for its rendering of the University 
of Arizona ineligible for postseason competition because “there are 
simply too many factors other than the NCAA sanctions and the alleged 
injury for [the court] to find that a proximate relationship exists.” 
Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 378 (D. Ariz. 1983). But a similar 
group boycott claim would not be nearly as difficult if brought by an 
NCAA member because the threat of sanction by the NCAA would 
cause a nearly certain loss of sports-related revenues. See, e.g., NCAA v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (finding for the 
plaintiffs in a group boycott claim brought by two members of the NCAA). 
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1. The Seminal Case: NCAA v. Board of Regents 
The case most directly on point for finding the NCAA’s no-pay 
rules to function as an illegal group boycott is the Supreme Court’s 
1984 decision, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma.80 There, the Court held that limiting the number of games 
that an NCAA member may broadcast on television violated section 1 
of the Sherman Act because it “eliminate[d] competitors from the 
[broadcast television] market.”81 The Court further implied that any 
attempt to ban an NCAA member for refusing to comply with its 
television bylaws was tantamount to an illegal group boycott because 
it prevented NCAA membership for those colleges seeking to compete 
in the free market for broadcast revenues.82 
The litigation in Board of Regents was long and complex, lasting 
for more than three years. At the district court level, the court held 
that the NCAA’s television bylaws represented an illegal restraint on 
output, and that the NCAA, in its allocation of television rights, 
illegally “maintain[ed] mechanisms for punishing cartel members who 
[sought] to stray from these production quotas.”83 The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed, concurring that “[t]he television plan at issue . . . restrict[ed] 
the plaintiffs’ revenues, market share, and output,”84 and further 
noting that “the television [plan’s] . . . threat of expulsion and 
boycott [are] sanctions which clearly have anticompetitive 
 
80. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
81. Id. at 108. Along those same lines, the Supreme Court found that the 
NCAA television policy had no offsetting procompetitive benefit because 
it neither increased the output of televised games nor reduced the price 
of televised games. Id. at 113. 
82. See id. at 106 (explaining that “as a practical matter all member 
institutions need NCAA approval” to function). 
83. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 
1301 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 
(10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Furthermore, the district 
court found each of the other elements required under a full rule of 
reason analysis were also met. It concluded that the Universities of 
Oklahoma and Georgia suffered “antitrust harm” because they were able 
to show the likelihood of lost revenues due to the television broadcast 
restraints. See id. at 1301–02 (concluding that such injuries are “direct 
and substantial, and not indirect or derivative of injury alleged to have 
been suffered by the public at large”). Meanwhile, it held that the 
NCAA exercised “market power” in both a relevant market for college 
football television broadcasts and the competition in college sports 
because, “[a]s a practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a 
prerequisite for institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded 
athletic program.” See id. at 1288. 
84. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1151 
(10th Cir. 1983). 
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potential.”85 Thus, even if the NCAA restraint had not affected 
output, the appellate court still would have found the threat of 
expelling noncomplying members to require careful scrutiny under a 
full rule of reason analysis.86 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court similarly ruled that the NCAA’s 
television plan was illegal because it “eliminates competitors from the 
market, since only those broadcasters able to bid on television rights 
covering the entire NCAA can compete.”87 In addition, the Court 
explained that “when there is an agreement in terms of price or 
output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is needed to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive characteristics of such agreement.’”88 
2. Other Instructive Supreme Court Opinions 
Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of Regents focused 
mostly on output restraints, several other Supreme Court decisions 
unrelated to college sports touch more directly on the conclusion that 
trade associations may not serve as “extra-judicial tribunals.”89 For 
instance, in Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade 
Commission,90 the Supreme Court affirmed a Federal Trade 
Commission decree that enjoined members of a fashion trade 
association from combining “among themselves to combat 
and . . . destroy all competition from the sale of garments which are 
copies of their ‘original creators.’”91 In finding the trade association’s 
self-governance to be illegal, the Court explained that members of a 
trade association may not collectively agree to boycott other members 
for failing to follow association rules, nor may they issue “heavy fines” 
 
85. Id. at 1161 (finding that plaintiffs’ claim of an output restraint was per 
se illegal, and their group boycott claim was subject to the full rule of 
reason inquiry). 
86. See id. 
87. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 108 (1984). 
Although the Supreme Court believed the restraint could not be deemed 
illegal under a mere per se test, it found the district court sufficiently 
analyzed the restraint under its “quick look” review. Id. 
88. Id. at 109 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). 
89. Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 
(1941) (discussing how such internal self-governance impermissibly 
“trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the 
statute” (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 
211, 242 (1899))). 
90. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).  
91. Id. at 461. 
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on those competitors that are unwilling to go along with the 
majority’s view.92 
Similarly, in Anderson v. Shipowners’ Association of Pacific 
Coast,93 the Supreme Court held it was illegal for a trade association 
that owned and operated almost all of the American merchant vessels 
along the Pacific Coast to “surrender[ ] . . . freedom of action in the 
matter of employing seamen and agree[ ] to abide by the will of the 
associations.”94 There, the Court presumed that any combination 
among competitors to govern the terms of employment for an entire 
industry violated the Sherman Act.95 
The guiding principles of both Fashion Originators and Anderson 
further call into doubt the NCAA’s attempt to impose a self-
regulatory regime that mandates members not pay their student-
athletes. This is because, much like the earlier self-governance regimes 
that the Supreme Court rejected as illegal, the NCAA controls nearly 
all of the businesses in its trade—making a member’s ban from the 
association a significant hardship.96 In addition, as one district court 
opinion has explained, “it is clear from the evidence that an 
institution which withdraws or is expelled from the NCAA could no 
longer operate a fully-rounded intercollegiate athletic program.”97 
Because “[n]on-member institutions could not compete in the 
prestigious NCAA championship events . . . [t]hey would therefore be 
unable to recruit quality athletes into their programs.”98 Thus, “[a]s a 
practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a prerequisite for 
institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic 
program.”99 
Another line of Supreme Court decisions outlaws trade 
associations from enforcing “absolute ban[s] on competitive 
bidding”—an additional aspect of the NCAA’s group boycott.100 For 
 
92. Id. at 463–65. 
93.  272 U.S. 359 (1926). 
94. Id. at 364–65. 
95. See id. at 362–65.  
96. See generally Jeffrey L. Kessler, Tournament Has Become March 
Monopoly Madness, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2004, at 9 (comparing the 
NCAA’s control of the college basketball market to “a 7-foot center 
playing in a fixed game in which no one else is allowed to be taller than 
6 feet”). 
97. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 
(W.D. Okla. 1982), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th 
Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. (emphasis added). 
100. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692–93 
(1978) (adopting the district court’s finding that such a ban “‘impedes 
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example, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States,101 the Supreme Court nullified an engineering trade 
association’s canon of ethics that prevented members from securing 
contracts by offering a lower price than their competitors for a given 
job.102 Noting that “[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment 
that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but 
also better goods and services,” the Court explained that any 
attempts to prevent companies from competing on the attribute of 
price was unreasonable.103 Moreover, the Court found it entirely 
irrelevant that the engineering firms were still able to compete on 
other factors given that only one important factor (price) had been 
removed.104 
This conclusion, expressed so cogently by the Supreme Court in 
Professional Engineers, would lead to the same inevitable conclusion 
regarding the NCAA’s principle of amateurism: that it is illegal 
because it prevents its members from engaging in competitive 
“bidding” to recruit student-athletes.105 Furthermore, the fact that 
Professional Engineers involved the selling of services—compared to 
the NCAA’s no-pay rules, which affect the purchase of services—
makes no difference under the law because, from an economic 
perspective, monopoly and monopsony markets lead to similar risks of 
consumer harm.106 
 
the ordinary give and take of the market place’ and . . . deprives . . . 
customer[s] of ‘the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting 
engineering services’” (quoting 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975))). 
101.  435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
102. Id. at 692–93. 
103. Id. at 695. 
104. See id. at 684, 693 (noting that the society’s preference to have 
customers hire engineers on the basis of background and reputation, not 
price, was nothing more than restraint in violation of § 1). 
105. Id. (rejecting the canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding 
because it was not justified under the Sherman Act). 
106. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 
U.S. 312, 321 (2007) (“The kinship between monopoly and monopsony 
suggests that similar legal standards should apply to claims of 
monopolization and to claims of monopsonization.”); see also Brown v. 
Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing 
the harms of wage fixing in a monopsony market as being much the 
same as price fixing in a monopoly market); cf. Leroy, supra note 73, at 
1087 (explaining that “[w]hile monopoly controls pricing by limiting 
competition to sell a product or a service, a monopsony controls pricing 
by limiting purchasing competition”). 
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IV. Why Lower Court Decisions Finding the NCAA’s 
Eligibility Rules to Be Noncommercial Are Either 
Inapposite or Wrongly Decided 
Despite the favorable Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent 
discussed in Part III, not all of today’s case law clearly supports 
finding the NCAA’s no-pay rules illegal. Indeed, eight lower courts 
within the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits have contrarily held that 
the NCAA’s “eligibility” rules are exempt from antitrust scrutiny 
because these rules do not affect “trade or commerce” and thus fail to 
meet one of the threshold requirements for antitrust scrutiny.107 These 
decisions, however, rely on inaccurate factual presumptions about the 
NCAA and outdated interpretations of antitrust law that have since 
been rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, although these decisions 
survive as a deviant strain of precedent within three federal circuits, they 
cannot survive the Supreme Court’s current antitrust jurisprudence. 
A. A Brief Discussion of the Eight Lower Court Decisions Finding the 
NCAA Eligibility Rules to Be Noncommercial 
The first lower court to hold the NCAA’s eligibility rules 
noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust scrutiny was the 
District of New Jersey in its 1974 ruling, College Athletic Placement 
Service, Inc. v. NCAA.108 There, the plaintiff—a company that helped 
young athletes find college scholarships—brought suit to enjoin the 
NCAA from enforcing an amateurism bylaw that prevented student-
athletes from paying companies that assisted with the finding of 
scholarship opportunities.109 Without ruling directly on the 
competitive merits, the court held that the legal challenge presented 
in the case did not come within the purview of the Sherman Act 
because it served merely to “preserv[e] the educational standards in 
its member institutions.”110 The court relied primarily on an earlier 
decision from the First Circuit—Marjorie Webster Junior College, 
Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges111—which held that a 
college’s failure to obtain accreditation from a nonprofit association 
 
107. Sherman Act §§ 1–7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). Specifically, “[e]very 
contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared illegal.” Id. at § 3 
(emphasis added). 
108. No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974). 
109. Id. at *1. 
110. Id. at *4. 
111.  432 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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did not give rise to antitrust harm because “denial of accreditation 
[was] not tantamount to exclusion . . . from operating successfully.”112  
The following year, the District of Massachusetts decided a 
similar case, Jones v. NCAA,113 also citing Marjorie Webster to 
support finding an NCAA bylaw exempt from antitrust scrutiny.114 
The dispute in Jones related to whether the NCAA could deem a 
college hockey player ineligible for competition based on the player’s 
previous receipt of an athletic stipend.115 The court concluded that the 
plaintiff could not challenge the NCAA’s rule banning such a player 
because the plaintiff did not show how “the actions of the [NCAA] in 
setting eligibility guidelines ha[d] any nexus to commercial or business 
activities in which the defendant might engage.”116 In addition, the 
court noted that even if the claim was not barred on noncommercial 
grounds, the NCAA still did not act with sufficient “scienter” to 
violate antitrust law.117 
Thereafter in Gaines v. NCAA,118 the Middle District of 
Tennessee similarly held that a plaintiff wishing to return to college 
football after entering the NFL draft could not bring an antitrust 
challenge against the NCAA.119 The Gaines decision was reached six 
years after the Supreme Court ruled favorably for the plaintiffs in 
Board of Regents.120 Nevertheless, the court differentiated the case by 
noting a legal difference “between the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the 
 
112. Id. at 656. Nevertheless, the proposition relied on in Marjorie Webster 
Junior College was decidedly different from that in College Athletic 
Placement Service, as the latter restraint did far more than just cause 
the plaintiffs to suffer social stigma; it entirely precluded the plaintiffs 
from maintaining their business relationships. See Coll. Athletic 
Placement Serv., 1974 WL 998, at *2 (describing a letter from the 
NCAA to the College Athletic Placement Service indicating the intent 
to declare any student-athlete ineligible based on their parents’ decision 
to contract with the College Athletic Placement Service). 
113. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).  
114. Id. at 303. 
115. See id. at 296–98. 
116. Id. at 303. 
117. Id. at 304. 
118. 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).  
119. Id. at 740 (discussing Vanderbilt University football player Bradford L. 
Gaines’s challenge to an NCAA bylaw that revokes an athlete’s amateur 
status when he enters a professional draft or enters into an agreement 
with an agent to negotiate a professional contract). Perhaps due to poor 
lawyering, Gaines’s antitrust challenge to the NCAA bylaws was 
brought exclusively under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which relates to 
monopolization, rather than under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
relates to collusion. See id. at 741. 
120. Id.; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
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televising of college football games and the NCAA’s efforts to 
maintain a discernible line between amateurism and 
professionalism.”121 Thus, the court adopted a bifurcated test to 
determine whether NCAA conduct affects interstate commerce, 
placing “business rules” (such as the television policy) on one side of 
an imaginary line and “eligibility rules” (such as those related to 
amateurism) on the other side.122 
Then in 1998, the Third Circuit formally adopted Gaines’s 
bifurcated test for NCAA commerciality in another case, Smith v. 
NCAA.123 Smith involved a plaintiff’s challenge to an NCAA bylaw 
that prohibited a student-athlete from participating in intercollegiate 
athletics while attending a graduate school different from the one 
where she attended college.124 Citing College Athletic Placement 
Services, Jones, and Gaines, the court found this particular bylaw 
immune from competitive scrutiny because “many district courts have 
[already] held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s 
promulgation and enforcement of eligibility requirements.”125 
After Smith, “[t]he parade marched on” with two other Third 
Circuit rulings that found the NCAA’s eligibility rules to be 
noncommercial and thus exempt from review.126 In Bowers v. 
NCAA,127 the District of New Jersey held that the NCAA bylaws that 
determine academic eligibility lie outside the Sherman Act’s reach 
because Third Circuit precedent indicated that those bylaws are “not 
 
121. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743. The court further proclaimed that, even 
though the Supreme Court never explicitly stated in Board of Regents 
that eligibility rules were noncommercial, its limited citation to Jones v. 
NCAA was reason enough for courts to continue treating Jones as good 
law. Id. (“Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not state that 
eligibility rules were not subject to antitrust scrutiny, it cited a case 
with approval, Jones v. NCAA, . . . which stated exactly that.”) 
(citation omitted). 
122. See id. at 747 (“The Supreme Court distinguished the NCAA television 
restrictions, which it invalidated under § 1, from ‘most of the regulatory 
controls of the NCAA [which] are justifiable means of fostering 
competition among amateur teams and therefore procompetitive because 
they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.’” (alteration in 
original) (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (1984))). 
123. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the 
Gaines court and others “that the eligibility rules are not related to the 
NCAA’s commercial or business activities”), vacated and remanded on 
different grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
124. Id. at 183. 
125. Id. at 185. 
126. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 278 (1972). 
127. 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998).  
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related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities.”128 Likewise, 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Pocono Invitational 
Sports Camps v. NCAA129 that an NCAA bylaw allowing Division I 
coaches to evaluate high school basketball players only at certified 
camps did not violate antitrust law because “[t]he plaintiff [did not] 
show that the challenged restraint involved ‘trade or commerce.’”130 
Finally and most recently in Bassett v. NCAA,131 the Sixth 
Circuit followed the Third Circuit’s lead when it adopted a bifurcated 
test for evaluating whether NCAA conduct is sufficiently commercial 
to fall within the scope of the Sherman Act.132 The dispute in Bassett 
specifically involved the legality of an NCAA mandate requiring that 
any college wishing to hire a coach who previously engaged in 
recruiting violations to first receive permission from the NCAA 
Committee on Infractions.133 Ultimately, the court found the rule was 
noncommercial, even though the court acknowledged that the NCAA 
itself was a commercial actor.134 The court proceeded to describe the 
NCAA coaching restraint as “anti-commercial” because, if not for the 
rule, any NCAA member that wanted to hire a coach who had 
engaged in previous NCAA recruiting infractions could obtain “a 
decided competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining highly 
prized student athletes.”135  
B. Why Each of These Eight Cases Was Wrongly Decided 
In a vacuum, each of these eight decisions seems to present a 
strong basis for finding the NCAA’s no-pay rules to be noncommercial 
(or, as Bassett would argue, anti-commercial) and thus valid under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, each of these decisions 
suffers from at least one, if not multiple, defects in its analysis.  
The first major defect with the above decisions arises from the 
premise first adopted in College Athletic Placement Service that the 
NCAA is noncommercial based on its status as an association 
 
128. Id. at 497 (quoting Smith, 139 F.3d at 185–86) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
129. 317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Penn. 2004). 
130. Id. at 580. 
131. 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008). 
132. See id. at 435 (noting that the restraint alleged in the case involved the 
group boycott of Bassett arising from NCAA-imposed sanctions). 
133. Id. at 429. 
134. See id. at 433. 
135. See id. 
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involved in higher education.136 However, at the time College Athletic 
Placement Service was decided, this issue was not well settled.137  
Indeed, it was not until the very next year that the Supreme 
Court held in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar138 that “[t]he nature of 
an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the 
Sherman Act.”139 Thus, the Court’s decision in Goldfarb implicitly 
overruled College Athletic Placement Service by confirming that “the 
exchange of [a] service for money is [always] ‘commerce’ in the most 
common usage of that word”—even if the service involved a learned 
profession.140 Thereafter in Board of Regents, the Supreme Court 
identified the NCAA’s restraint on television broadcasts as being 
commercial without even addressing the issue, seemingly bringing 
further closure to any argument that these associations involved in 
higher education are innately noncommercial.141 
Another notable defect with many of these rulings is that they 
cite Jones v. NCAA142—a case in which the court not only ruled in 
favor of the NCAA based on the rejected educational exception but 
also based on the NCAA’s purported lack of “scienter.”143 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never found lack of “scienter” to 
be a factor precluding an antitrust inquiry on the merits. To the 
contrary, the Supreme Court has long endorsed the principle that 
“[n]either the fact that [a] conspiracy may be intended to promote the 
 
136. Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 
998, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974). 
137. Cf. id. at *5 (“It is possible to conceive of restrictions on eligibility for 
accreditation that could have little other than a commercial motive; and 
as such, antitrust policy would presumably be applicable.”). 
138. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
139. Id. at 787 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945)). 
140. Id.; see also Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148–49 (5th Cir. 
1997) (explaining that a close reading of Goldfarb negates the finding 
that the NCAA is somehow exempt from antitrust law under a special 
educational exception). As one appellate court has since explained, 
although Goldfarb specifically rejected the claim that lawyers were 
exempt from antitrust law as a special “learned profession,” the Court’s 
holding would logically extend to the other purported learned 
professions in which profits are made, such as college sports. Id. at 1149 
n.14 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788). 
141. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 
(1984). 
142.  392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975). 
143. See id. at 303–04.  
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public welfare, or that of the industry . . . is sufficient [grounds] to 
avoid the penalties of the Sherman Act.”144 
A third defect with many of these cases is that they interpret the 
threshold issue of “interstate commerce” based on a particular bylaw 
rather than the NCAA’s overall business activities. However, the 
Supreme Court explained in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New 
Orleans, Inc.145 that the only thing a plaintiff must demonstrate to 
meet the threshold issue of “interstate commerce” is a “substantial 
effect on interstate commerce generated by [a defendant’s general 
business activities].”146 Thus, the bylaw-specific evaluation of the 
NCAA’s conduct has been flatly rejected.147 
Moreover, from a factual perspective, many of these cases rely on 
faulty presumptions about the NCAA. For example, many of the 
aforementioned decisions imply that college athletics operate just like 
other educational programs.148 But contrary to all other educational 
programs, “intercollegiate athletics in its management is clearly 
business, and big business at that.”149 For example, in 2010, a twelve-
team athletic conference collected more than $1 billion in athletic 
receipts.150 That same year, CBS paid more than $750 million to  
144. Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1942) 
(citations omitted), aff’d, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); see also Nat’l Soc’y of 
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695–96 (1978). 
145. 444 U.S. 232 (1980). 
146. See id. at 242–43 (holding with regard to “respondents’ brokerage 
activity” and rejecting the contention that the plaintiffs were required 
to make a “more particularized showing” as to “the alleged conspiracy 
to fix commission rates, or . . . other aspects of respondents’ activity”) 
While the disputed issue in McLain primarily related to the “interstate” 
aspect rather than the “commerce” aspect of “interstate commerce,” the 
inquiry was nevertheless performed together, leading to the logical result 
that the court intended a review of both components in the gestalt 
rather than based on just a single bylaw. See id. 
147.  Id. (“If establishing jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful 
conduct itself had an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would 
be defeated by a demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have 
its intended anticompetitive effect. This is not the rule of our cases.”). 
148. See, e.g., Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303–04 (D. Mass. 1977) 
(describing intercollegiate hockey as an educational program in a major 
university). 
149. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Bd. 
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288–89 
(W.D. Okla. 1982) (“[I]t is cavil to suggest that college football, or indeed 
higher education itself, is not a business.”), aff’d in part, remanded in 
part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
150. See Branch, supra note 35, at 82 (explaining that in 2010, the “football-
crazed” Southeastern Conference became the first college athletic 
conference to collect more than $1 billion in revenues, and the Big Ten 
Conference trailed closely behind at $905 million). 
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purchase the television broadcast rights to the NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament.151 Meanwhile, an increasing number of college 
athletic departments receive millions of dollars per year from selling 
their stadium advertising rights, selling advertising space on players’ 
equipment, and using players’ names in licensed videogames.152 All of 
these factors clearly indicate that college athletics has become “big 
business” and, by all accounts, a commercial actor.153 
Finally, also as a factual matter, many of the rulings that have 
found the NCAA to be noncommercial turn for support to language in 
the NCAA’s own bylaws denoting the association’s purported amateur 
status. However, any reliance on the NCAA’s own bylaws leads to a 
misleading result. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, “[a]n 
ongoing § 1 violation cannot evade § 1 scrutiny simply by giving the 
ongoing violation a name and label.”154 If the opposite were true, all 
trade associations would simply define their activities as amateurism 
as a way to circumvent the antitrust laws.  
V. Why Lower Court Decisions Holding the NCAA 
Eligibility Rules to Be Procompetitive  
Are Similarly Misguided 
In addition to the aforementioned cases, four lower court decisions 
have upheld NCAA rules related to eligibility under the rule of reason 
based on their purported procompetitive benefits.155 And much like 
the eight lower court decisions that found the NCAA to be 
 
151. Id. at 93. 
152. See id. at 86, 94 (discussing several of these types of agreements, 
including a $10.6 million deal between Auburn University and Under 
Armour); see also Edelman, supra note 19 (discussing the payment of 
royalties from the videogame maker Electronic Arts to the NCAA for 
use of the NCAA names, marks, and perhaps even player identities in 
their game). 
153. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150 (“[The NCAA and its members] are 
significantly involved in interstate commerce in the conduct of the 
athletic programs.”). 
154. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2010). 
155. A number of other cases not discussed in this section have also found 
NCAA rules to survive the rule of reason based on the plaintiff’s failure 
to meet his burden with respect to showing either market power or 
antitrust harm. See, e.g., Warrior Sports, Inc. v. NCAA, 623 F.3d 281 
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a rule changing the acceptable size of the 
heads of lacrosse sticks did not unreasonably restrain trade or commerce 
in violation of the Sherman Act); Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 
1059 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a rule that discouraged a student-
athlete from transferring colleges within a single conference did not have 
significant anticompetitive effects within any relevant antitrust market).  
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noncommercial, each of these four additional decisions suffers from 
one or more legal defects. 
A. Cases Finding the NCAA Eligibility Rules Are Procompetitive 
The first decision to find an NCAA eligibility rule, although 
commercial, to be procompetitive was the Fifth Circuit’s 1977 ruling 
in Hennessey v. NCAA.156 There, the court held that a challenge to 
the NCAA’s limit on the number of coaches per team “come[s] close, 
but fall[s] short” under a rule of reason analysis.157 In finding the limit 
on coaches to be procompetitive, the court explained that the rule 
had a reasonable “motive” of assisting colleges with less funding to 
“preserve and foster competition” on equal terms.158 Thus, the court 
expressed fear that if it did not uphold the NCAA’s bylaw, a war of 
attrition would ensue, resulting in some colleges devoting all of their 
resources to college athletics.159 
Six years later in Justice v. NCAA,160 the District of Arizona 
upheld an NCAA bylaw that had disqualified the University of 
Arizona football team from competing in postseason play after its 
players accepted prohibited benefits such as free transportation and 
lodging.161 In upholding the team’s ban from postseason play, the 
Justice court explained that the NCAA postseason eligibility rules 
were procompetitive because they “have been shown to lack an 
anticompetitive purpose and to be directly related to the NCAA 
objectives of preserving amateurism and promoting fair 
competition.”162 In addition, the court noted that “NCAA regulations 
designed to preserve amateurism and fair competition have previously 
been upheld as reasonable restraints [of trade] under the rule of 
reason”—citing Hennessey, Jones, and even Athletic Placement 
Service, Inc.163 
Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit held in its 1988 decision McCormack 
v. NCAA164 that a college football player’s challenge to the NCAA 
death penalty failed under the rule of reason.165 In rejecting the  
156. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
157. Id. at 1154. 
158. Id. at 1153. 
159. Id. (“Financial pressures upon many members, not merely to ‘catch up’, 
but to ‘keep up’, were beginning to threaten both the competitive, and 
amateur, nature of the programs . . . .”). 
160. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
161. See id. at 383. 
162. Id. at 382. 
163. Id. 
164. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). 
165. Id. at 1344. 
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football player’s challenge, the court differentiated its holding from 
that of Board of Regents by quoting that case for the proposition 
that, unlike rules that govern television broadcast markets, rules that 
determine who is eligible to compete in college football games 
“enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics” and support an 
“academic tradition” that lies at the core of the unique character of 
college athletics.166 The court further quoted Board of Regents for the 
proposition that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the 
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering 
competition,” and that one of the NCAA rules that can be viewed as 
procompetitive is “athletes must get paid.”167 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held in Banks v. NCAA168 that the 
NCAA bylaws that prevent student-athletes from exploring 
professional opportunities were procompetitive based on the same 
Board of Regents language that was cited by McCormack.169 Banks 
further described the plaintiff’s antitrust claim as “absurd” because, 
in the court’s opinion, “the NCAA does not exist as a minor league 
training ground for future NFL players but rather to provide an 
opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a 
collegiate education.”170 
B. Why Each of These Four Cases Was Wrongly Decided 
Much like the eight decisions that found the NCAA to be 
noncommercial, these four decisions finding NCAA eligibility rules to 
be procompetitive are easily rebutted based on their substantial 
analytical errors. For example, the very first decision to find an 
NCAA eligibility rule to be procompetitive, Hennessey v. NCAA,171 
ruled in this manner primarily because the NCAA rule kept member 
costs down.172 But this holding contradicts longstanding antitrust 
doctrine embedded within many Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, as 
 
166. Id. 
167. Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
102 (1984)). 
168. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).  
169. Id. at 1089. 
170. See id. at 1089–90. In this vein, the appellate court noted that “[t]he no-
draft rule has no more impact on the market for college football players 
than other NCAA eligibility requirements such as grades, semester hours 
carried, or requiring a high school diploma.” See id. at 1087–88. 
171. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
172. Id. at 1153 (“[The NCAA bylaw] was . . . intended to be an ‘economy 
measure’. . . . by curtailing . . . potentially monopolistic practices by the 
more powerful [schools] . . . and to reorient the programs into their 
traditional role as amateur sports operating as part of the educational 
process.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
92 
far back as the 1897 decision United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight 
Association,173 the Supreme Court has held that keeping costs down is 
not a relevant procompetitive benefit under a rule of reason inquiry.174 
Meanwhile, the Court explained in United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co.175 that if businesses were allowed to restrain trade simply as a 
way of saving money, “the Sherman Act would . . . be emasculated” 
because this defense would apply to most, if not all, combinations.176 
Another defect with the Hennessey decision is that, much like 
Jones, Hennessey focused extensively on the NCAA’s “motive” of 
allowing colleges, irrespective of their athletic funding, to compete on 
equal terms.177 Although such analysis at one time may have been 
within the bounds of an acceptable rule of reason inquiry, the 
Supreme Court clarified in Professional Engineers that any proper 
rule of reason analysis must turn on the competitive significance of 
the restraint rather than whether the restraint is “in the interest of 
the members of [the] industry.”178 Thus, even a positive, noneconomic 
motive can no longer save an otherwise illegal restraint.  
The court’s analysis in Justice made the similar error of relying 
on social benefits rather than procompetitive effects.179 There, the 
plaintiffs on appeal suggested that recognizing such benefits 
 
173. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
174. Id. at 304, 341 (applying the Sherman Act to a railroad price-fixing 
agreement—which defendants claimed benefited “patrons of the railway 
line . . . and the public at large”—and stating that an agreement’s 
“violation of law [cannot] be made valid by allegation of good intention 
or of desire to simply maintain reasonable rates”). Furthermore, the 
court held that intent is not an element that requires proof in an 
antitrust case. Id. (“[T]he intent alleged . . . is not necessary to be 
proved. The question is one of law in regard to the meaning and effect 
of the agreement itself, namely: Does the agreement restrain trade or 
commerce in any way so as to be a violation of the act?”); see also 
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 350 n.22 (1982) 
(citing Trans-Missouri for the proposition that “in the first price-fixing 
case arising under the Sherman Act, the Court was required to pass on 
the sufficiency of the defendants’ plea that they had established rates 
that were actually beneficial to the consumers”). 
175. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
176. Id. at 221. 
177. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977). 
178. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
179. See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983) (“The 
sanctions imposed by the NCAA in this case are reasonably related to 
the legitimate goals of preserving amateurism and promoting fair 
competition . . . .”); see also Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153 (noting that 
the NCAA “is endowed with certain benefits to society”). 
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contradicted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Professional Engineers.180 
Nevertheless, the court in Justice discarded these concerns with a 
mere footnote, stating that “[t]he plaintiffs’ contention is belied by a 
number of cases decided subsequent to Professional Engineers which 
have upheld comparable self-regulatory actions of sports organizations 
under the rule of reason.”181 The court never even analyzed the four 
cases cited in support of its conclusion—each of which was arguably 
inapposite to both Professional Engineers and the case at hand.182  
180. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382 n.17 (“The plaintiffs argue that the 
rationale of Hennessey and Jones is no longer applicable in light of 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States and that the 
NCAA cannot justify actions which exclude a competition by assessing a 
‘social’ purpose such as promoting amateurism or ‘fair competition’ 
under the rule of reason.” (citation omitted)). 
181. See id. Upon review of these four cases, there is a strong argument that 
three of them do not support a trade association’s right to self-regulate 
on the basis of purely social benefits, notwithstanding a limited carve-
out for safety and industry-wide liability mentioned by a footnote in 
Professional Engineers. 435 U.S. at 696 n.22. 
 Far from a purely social benefit, the first case upheld a rule based on 
the market’s ability to respond. Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S.T.A., 
665 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding a tennis association’s rule 
that allowed only single-strung rackets in competition, recognizing that 
competition rules pertaining to the type of eligible playing equipment do 
not cause “antitrust harm” in the conventional sense because all 
equipment manufacturers can alter their product to conform with the 
association’s equipment rules); accord Warrior Sports, Inc. v. NCAA, 
623 F.3d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding a lacrosse league’s 
equipment rules for a similar reason). 
 The second case fits squarely within the safety-industry liability 
exception mentioned in Professional Engineers. Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 
1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding an NHL bylaw that precluded a 
player with just one eye from competition because the primary purpose 
of the rule was safety and avoiding league-wide liability); Professional 
Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696 n.22; see also Edelman, supra note 42, at 653 
(explaining how the Professional Engineers carve-out applies to Neeld).  
 The third case can be interpreted as applying the safety-industry 
liability exception to horses. See Cooney v. Am. Horse Shows Ass’n, 
496 F. Supp. 424, 427, 430–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding a bylaw that 
subjects a trainer to possible suspension based on the presence of drugs 
in a horse for which the trainer was responsible). Cooney may constitute 
a ruling based implicitly on the safety-liability standard (as applied to 
horses) because the court stated that the trainer, “more than anyone 
else, was in a position to know exactly who administered the drug.” Id. 
at 433. 
 The fourth case presents a far closer call because the plaintiff failed to 
present “a patently anticompetitive purpose” behind the World Boxing 
Association’s suspension rule. See Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 
675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1981). 
182. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382 n.17. 
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McCormack presented a very different type of problem for the 
courts, as the factual background in that case was somewhat 
bizarre.183 The party most directly harmed by the NCAA’s death 
penalty sanction—Southern Methodist University—had previously 
agreed to accept the sanction and thus was not a party to the case.184 
Meanwhile, the original plaintiff was merely an alumnus of the school 
and his claim was rejected due to lack of standing.185 As a result, the 
court was left to grapple with the claims of the football player 
plaintiffs, who were initially joined to the case by McCormack solely 
as a way to try to preserve his standing.186  
In addressing the football players’ claims, the McCormack court 
properly turned to Board of Regents as the most appropriate 
precedent.187 However—perhaps troubled by the bizarre posture of the 
case—the court gerrymandered the language in Board of Regents to 
rule in favor of the NCAA.188 For example, the language quoted by 
McCormack to support its finding that the NCAA’s death-penalty 
sanction was procompetitive actually came from a section of Board of 
Regents that explained why NCAA conduct should be reviewed under 
the full rule of reason rather than the per se test.189 Even more 
troublesome, the exact language from that case actually states that 
the NCAA’s amateurism rules should be analyzed under the full rule 
of reason by a court because they “can be viewed as 
procompetitive.”190 By using the word “can” rather than “must” and 
using it in the context of determining the proper test for reviewing 
NCAA conduct, it is not clear that the Board of Regents court 
concluded the NCAA’s no-pay rules were procompetitive.191 Thus, the 
 
183. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting 
the plaintiffs’ allegations that the NCAA’s actions “deprived [alumni] 
and others of ‘their right to associate together in support of the 
University by attendance at the football games of the University,’ while 
the football players have been ‘forced to discontinue their athlete-
academic duties’ at SMU and the cheerleaders have lost the opportunity 
to lead cheers at football games”). 
184. See id. at 1341 (explaining that Southern Methodist University did not 
appeal the NCAA’s decision). 
185. Id. 
186. See id. at 1340 (noting that McCormack amended his complaint to 
include football players after the first complaint was dismissed for 
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted). 
187. Id. at 1343. 
188. Id. at 1344.  
189. Id. at 1343–44. 
190. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
191. Id. (emphasis added). 
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actual language in Board of Regents never truly supported 
McCormack’s conclusion.192 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Banks likewise 
misconstrued the language in Board of Regents to reach a conclusion 
starkly different from the Supreme Court’s inference in that case.193 
This error was pointed out by Judge Joel Flaum in a vigorous dissent, 
in which he concluded that “the market at issue here is the college 
football labor market” and “[i]f the no-draft rule were scuttled, 
colleges that promised their athletes the opportunity to test the 
waters in the NFL draft . . . would be more attractive to athletes 
than colleges that declined to offer the same opportunity.”194 
Thereafter, Justice Harry Blackmun, in reviewing a bench 
memorandum assessing whether to grant certiorari in Banks, opined 
by hand on his memo that “CA7 got this one dead wrong.”195 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ultimately declined certiorari—
preventing Justice Blackmun from coining an opinion that would have 
potentially overturned Banks and its progeny.196 
VI. Why Closer Game Scores Cannot Save the NCAA 
No-Pay Rules but May Support Preserving Such Rules 
on a Conference-by-Conference Basis  
Finally, even beyond the above decisions that have granted 
unusually broad deference to the NCAA rules, numerous other 
sources, including law review articles and newspaper editorials, argue 
in favor of the NCAA no-pay rules for yet another reason—they 
improve the quality of college sports contests by keeping game scores 
 
192. Id.; see also McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1998). 
193. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting and 
subsequently misapplying the following language from Board of Regents: 
“most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA [are] a justifiable means 
of fostering competition among the amateur athletic teams and therefore 
are procompetitive because they enhance public interest in 
intercollegiate athletics” (quoting Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104)). 
194. Id. at 1081, 1095 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
195. See Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Blackmun on Banks v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (May 14, 1993), available at 
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1992/92Memo-pdf/92-
1466.pdf; see also Geoffrey Rapp, Banks v. NCAA Cert Pool Memo: 
“Seventh Circuit Dead Wrong,” SPORTS LAW BLOG, (Sept. 28, 2007, 
1:04 PM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2007/09/banks-v-ncaa-cert-
pool-memo-seventh.html (describing Supreme Court bench memo on 
Banks petition with Justice Blackmun’s handwritten comments). 
196. See Banks, 508 U.S. at 908. 
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closer together.197 Currently, antitrust law is in flux as to whether 
equalizing on-field competition serves as a relevant procompetitive 
benefit. On the one hand, past decisions such as Smith v. Pro 
Football, Inc.198 and Mackey v. NFL199 have held that closer scores can 
never offset an otherwise anticompetitive labor restraint.200 But on the 
other hand, dictum in the Supreme Court’s recent American 
Needle, Inc. v. NFL201 decision notes that “‘the interest in 
maintaining competitive balance’ among ‘athletic teams is legitimate 
and important.’”202 
Without going into the competitive merits of a restraint that 
helps to equalize game results (a topic perhaps worthy of an entirely 
separate article), that argument does little to save the NCAA’s no-
pay rules because there are other, less restrictive ways that colleges 
can level the sports playing field short of imposing a national, 
industry-wide bar on student-athlete compensation. For example, 
colleges could just as easily implement salary caps at the conference 
level rather than at the league level.203 Given that most college 
sporting events are played by teams from within a single conference, a 
conference-wide salary cap would have much the same effect of 
 
197. See LeRoy, supra note 73, at 1093 (explaining that labor restraints on 
college sports markets have procompetitive effects by “spreading, and 
preserving in place, the supply of talented players and making games 
more interesting”); see also David Brooks, The Amateur Ideal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, at A35 (commenting that no-pay rules force an 
“obsessively competitive group, to pay homage to academic pursuits” 
and that “college basketball is more thrilling than pro basketball 
because the game is still animated by amateur passions, not coldly 
calculating professional interests”). 
198. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
199. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
200. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186 (finding the NFL draft’s “alleged[ ] 
‘procompetitive’ . . . effect on the playing field” to be “nil”); Mackey, 
543 F.2d at 621 (“[T]he possibility of resulting decline in the quality of 
play would not justify the Rozelle Rule.”). 
201.  130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
202. Id. at 2217 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). 
203. See Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable nor 
Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, Antitrust, 
Spring 2010, at 51, 54–55 (2000) (arguing that a reasonable alternative 
under antitrust law would be to “devolve power from the NCAA to the 
various collegiate conferences” and allow the conferences to compete 
against one another for student-athletes). See generally James V. Koch, 
The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9, 
22 (1985) (discussing how the NCAA has already made a “clear attempt 
to group together members who have similar revenues, costs, and output 
characteristics”). 
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equalizing game scores without having the same ubiquitous, 
anticompetitive effect on college sports labor markets as do the 
NCAA’s current no-pay rules.204 
Indeed, rules governing student-athlete pay at the conference 
level, as a matter of antitrust law, would likely be far less restrictive 
to student-athletes, colleges, and consumers because individual 
conferences lack sufficient “market power” within any relevant market 
to illegally restrain trade.205 Thus, each individual sports conference 
represents just a small share of the overall college sports 
marketplace.206 
Furthermore, as a practical matter, conference-wide salary caps 
on student-athlete pay are unlikely to lead to a ubiquitous ban on 
student-athlete compensation. This is because some conferences would 
likely opt to allow student-athletes to receive money as a means to 
compete most effectively for student-athlete labor on an inter-
conference basis.207 Meanwhile, other conferences might opt to allow 
student-athlete pay after recognizing that taking the moral high 
ground may make some consumers more interested in purchasing 
 
204. See generally Eric Thieme, Note, You Can’t Win ’Em All: How the 
NCAA’s Dominance of the College Basketball Postseason Reveals There 
Will Never Be an NCAA Football Playoff, 40 IND. L. REV. 453 (2007) 
(discussing how the distribution of revenue evenly to conferences by the 
BCS promotes parity in those conferences). 
205. See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding the market for college athletes’ labor to be “national in scope”); 
see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) 
(explaining that a relevant market is defined by “the interchangeability 
of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product and 
substitutes for it”); Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. 
NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a 
“relevant market encompasses notions of geography as well as product 
use, quality and description” and that “reasonable interchangeability” is 
the standard for determining the limits of a given relevant market) 
(citations omitted); cf. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 
1319–20 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the enforcement of a rule created 
at the conference level that prevents colleges from paying their athletes 
was permissible under the rule of reason).  
206. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063–64 (suggesting that an athlete unhappy 
with the Pacific 10 Conference’s rules against intra-conference transfers 
should simply join a college team that participates in a different 
conference); cf. Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have “Market 
Power?” Exploring the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global 
Market for Men’s Basketball Player Labor, 41 Rutgers L.J. 549, 583–
84 (calling into doubt whether the court’s holding in Tanaka makes 
sense from a workers’ rights perspective given that it required a student-
athlete to move away from her home market to avoid the effects of a 
collusive agreement). 
207. See generally Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1064 (noting that athletic conferences 
“compete in the recruiting of student-athletes”). 
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game tickets, apparel, and other paraphernalia from those particular 
conferences.208 
Conclusion  
Over the past century, NCAA members have enjoyed immense 
profits by enforcing a principle of amateurism that keeps the revenues 
of college athletics away from student-athletes.209 But even though 
this principle of amateurism has become well embedded in the 
NCAA’s identity, it does not comport with traditional principles of 
antitrust law and free trade. To the contrary, the NCAA’s principle of 
amateurism likely violates section 1 of the Sherman Act by artificially 
prohibiting student-athlete pay and by eliminating from the college 
sports marketplace those colleges that wish to recruit top student-
athletes. 
Although eight lower courts have found the NCAA’s eligibility 
rules to be noncommercial and thus exempt from the Sherman Act, 
each of these decisions is wrongly decided. Many of these decisions 
ignore Supreme Court precedent explaining that competitive 
restraints in educational markets are to be viewed identically to 
competitive restraints in all other markets. Meanwhile, many other 
decisions disregard persuasive factual evidence indicating that college 
sports today have become a multibillion-dollar enterprise that engages 
in “interstate commerce.”  
Furthermore, four lower courts have held that the NCAA 
eligibility rules survive under the rule of reason inquiry based on these 
rules’ purported procompetitive benefits. Nevertheless, these decisions 
are similarly flawed. Most of these decisions that find NCAA 
eligibility rules to be procompetitive focus on the rules’ original 
intent, impact on member costs, and social policy goals—all factors 
that the Supreme Court has found to be irrelevant to a proper 
antitrust analysis. Moreover, some of these rulings have been 
expressly called into doubt by Judge Blackmun’s handwritten 
comments in Banks—leaving open the possibility that the Supreme 
Court does not agree with that case’s outcome.  
Of course, a proper antitrust analysis does not necessarily prohibit 
all agreements among colleges with respect to student-athlete 
 
208. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[The 
Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest 
materials progress . . . .”). 
209. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 864–65 (noting that the wealth generated 
by college athletics remains in the hands of a select few administrators, 
athletic directors, and coaches because student-athletes are prevented 
from profiting based upon their athletic abilities). 
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compensation. But a proper analysis would certainly prohibit those 
agreements where the parties agreeing to the restraint have “market 
power.” Thus, as a practical matter, overturning the NCAA no-pay 
rules would simply shift governance of student-athlete compensation 
to the discretion of individual athletic conferences. Such a shift would 
be advantageous to student-athletes, colleges, and consumers. 
For all of these reasons, it is likely a mere matter of time before a 
court enjoins the NCAA’s enforcement of its principle of amateurism. 
Until then, the NCAA has a choice—it can either proactively rewrite 
its rulebook in a manner that complies with the spirit of U.S. 
antitrust law, or it can wait until a court mandates such changes. 
Either way, however, it seems inevitable that the NCAA’s 
longstanding practice of profiting from the work product of student-
athletes is about to change. Simply stated, antitrust law does not 
permit the NCAA to impose rules that ubiquitously prevent student-
athlete pay. 
 
